A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.
Introduction
In one of his most often-cited papers, Hayek (1968) argues that competition on the marketplace serves as a "discovery procedure'' for new, previously unknown problem-solving routines. This argument, which is probably more or less undisputed with regard to the market for private goods, has also been proposed with regard to public goods: Competition between jurisdictions is supposed to provide incentives both to conduct experiments with new policies, and to learn from experiments conducted in other jurisdictions. The argument as such has been made, for example, by Salmon (1987) , Vihanto (1992) as well as Vanberg and Kerber (1994) . Nevertheless, the observation made by Oates (1999) , that many questions on decentralized political experimentation still remain to be answered in detail, appears to remain valid to date.
There are a number of contributions concerned with the general question, if political competition induces representatives to experiment with novel policies (e.g. Rose-Ackermann 1980, Kollman et al. 2000 , Strumpf 2002 . While these contributions come to conflicting results regarding representatives' reactions to political competition, they all tend to put emphasis on the decision-making of politicians, with the electorate playing a minor role at best. Our present paper differs from this literature in putting the emphasis on the voters themselves. The question is: Does a decentralised political framework offer sufficient incentives to induce collective learning that would not occur in a unitary setting?
The above-mentioned contributions have an important, but not always explicitly stated, assumption in common, which is the assumption that decision-making individuals have some motivation to gather information about the evolution of economic policy in other jurisdictions. This is certainly very plausible when we analyze individuals who are considering their "exit''-option: If a citizen considers herself mobile and has the option of leaving jurisdiction A for jurisdiction B, and if she can gather information about B at sufficiently low cost, then she obviously has an incentive to inform herself about the real disposable income that she can earn in B. But this incentive disappears if the option of mobility becomes irrelevant, and when the only remaining option is "voice'', which leads to incentives that let rational ignorance on collectively decided issues prevail. This problem seems to be widely neglected in most of the current literature on fiscal competition. 1 This confronts us with a seemingly paradoxical theoretical question: How do rationally ignorant voters learn, when in a strict sense they do not have any incentives to learn at all? At this point, we do not want to engage in a fundamental discussion regarding the appropriateness of Bayesian learning as a modeling technique in general (for a thorough discussion of that, see e.g. Hodgson 1997 and the literature cited there). But we believe the conclusion to be straightforward that it is not the appropriate modeling approach to capture the particular incentive structure sketched above. The costs involved with Bayesian updating, be it in terms of cognitive costs in information processing, or in terms of the costs of gathering information, appear to be prohibitively high, given that the private gains of this procedure are essentially nil. We therefore decide to model learning as a collective, social communication process which requires next to no effort at all on behalf of the single voter. Arguing from there, it will be shown that important implications for the theoretical concept of decentralised economic policy-making as a discovery procedure arise. Under plausible parameter configurations, learning from decentralised political experiments may not occur at all, or, which is a result that is new to the literature, political experimentation may occur only in the wrong (the relatively efficient) jurisdiction. To be able to focus on collective learning processes involving voters and citizens, we assume a tightly controlled government throughout the paper. The policies preferred by the majority of voters are executed frictionlessly and there are no control problems to be solved. In the present framework, with its emphasis on uncertainty regarding the true model of the economy, an alternative approach could assume that, like their counterparts in private firms, politicians can engage in cognitive leadership (Witt 1998) . This would be a plausible extension of the model developed in this paper, but to keep the analysis tractable, we will restrict ourselves to allow only collective learning of voters at this time. 2 The analysis presented in this paper will therefore amount to a theoretical thought experiment, in which the assumptions of rational ignorance and a political process tightly controlled by the voter play a pivotal role. Rational ignorance is probably the empirically more plausible of the two assumptions, given that voters are indeed often less than welleducated about economic issues. If it can be shown that political decentralisation increases the probability of collective learning under this very unfavourable assumption, then this result can probably be generalized towards frameworks that are, from the beginning, more favourable to learning processes -for example, if rational ignorance is not an important issue.
The argument will proceed as follows: In the following Section 2, the dissipation of policy-related theories within a population will be modeled as a frequency-dependent process leading to a stable equilibrium with a clear-cut majority theory. However, frequencydependence implies that the process has no unique equilibrium: pure chance plays a prominent role in determining the majority theory. Section 3 analyzes the choice of policy and its economic effects. In Section 4, a hypothetical, yet very general starting point for factor migration is introduced, and a distinction between loyal and perfectly mobile individuals is made. It is shown that under sufficiently general conditions, factor migration produces ambiguous price signals. Section 5 discusses the resulting incentives to critically examine given policies and to experiment with new policies from the point of view of rationally ignorant voters. Finally, Section 6 offers some conclusions.
2 Individual uncertainty and the emergence of common beliefs
The dissemination of policy-related conjectures
A central concept in our approach is that of model uncertainty: individuals are theoretically uncertain in the sense that they do not know the true model describing the actual properties of the economy within which they are acting and making decisions (see also Bischoff 2007 for a similar notion applied to a different problem). This uncertainty is the result of rational economic reasoning. With the quality of economic policy being a public good, and assuming that there is a large number of citizens so that the individual probability of having the decisive vote is approximately zero, individuals do not feel a need to invest into acquiring the most precise knowledge about economic policies. The necessary information is not available at no cost, and the cognitive cost of processing it is not zero.
Following Hirschman (1989) , however, it is assumed that individuals do feel an intrinsic need to have some point of view on issues of economic policy -but, given the public good problem, they do not feel a need to take the scientifically most up to date point of view. On the contrary, it is assumed that, once individuals have learned a set of conjectures about economic policy measures, they will attempt to retain them. To explain this tendency, assume that at a time t ¼ 0, a representative individual is completely uncertain and has no a priori knowledge at all to form an opinion on economic policy. Given her A discussion of the normative aspects of public entrepreneurship can be found in Schnellenbach (2007). intrinsic need for an explanation, she will acquire some theory X n 2 fX 1 ; . . . ; X N g that is supplied to her in public discourse. The supply side of the theory market is not explicitly modeled here. Following Lord Keynes' famous quote that "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist'' (Keynes 1936: chapter 24) , one could simply assume that every X n has been introduced by economists into public discourse. This admittedly arbitrary assumption is of course unsatisfactory from the point of view that a theory on economic evolution ought to explain not only the relevant communication (replication) and selection mechanisms, but also the emergence of variety, in our cases a variety of theories, in the first place (see Hodgson/Knudsen 2006) . However, treating this stage explicitly would render the argument presented in this paper much more complex, and at the same time add little to understanding the core question of learning from political experiments. Thus, we believe that the simplifying assumption is warranted here.
As a preliminary to explaining the choice of an X n by an arbitrary individual, we assume for simplicity that all citizens wish to maximise the same objective of economic policy, which in our case is the level of disposable income, but it might just as well be employment, output growth rates or something alike. Since we focus on the general learning process about economic policy measures and not on some specific, well-defined policy problem, we do not need to concern ourselves with the details of the maximisation problem here, and instead can simply assume that there is a common maximisation problem which concerns economic policy-makers and citizens.
In this case, a plausible criterion for choosing one X n among a possibly large number N > 0 of available sets is the number of individuals who are already convinced that X n gives an accurate description of the true working properties of the economy. If one is completely uncertain about the relative accuracy of all the available theories, then the number of individuals who already hold an X n may be interpreted as a signal for its usefulness relative to the other theories. It also may be the case that the uncertain citizen picks an X n following personal communication with other, already decided individuals. In this case, the probability that the uncertain individual communicates with an individual advocating X n will usually rise with the fraction of already decided individuals who adhere to that set of conjectures. Thus, it should be possible to model the individual selection of a set of conjectures about economic policy as a frequency-dependent process:
3 A relatively large number of individuals who already hold an X n reassures an uncertain individual that X n is not an obscure, but a reasonable choice. One tool among others to model such processes of frequencydependent self-organisation is the generalised Polya process, as proposed by Arthur et al. (1983 Arthur et al. ( , 1987 . The essence of this process is shown in (1), 3 To some degree, there is obviously a similarity to Kuran (1987) here, in the sense that individuals decide on taking a certain position according to the number of other individuals who already hold that position. The important difference, however, is that in our model there is no place for preference falsification: There is no difference between what individuals privately believe in and what they publicly advocate. Nevertheless, the result, for which Kuran coined the term "collective conservativism'', will be quite similar. The approach is also related to Kirman (1993) , who analyses frequency-dependend processes in which individuals agents can both self-convert to a different state, and be converted by other individuals with whom they interact, with certain probabilities. His model ist constructed so that a stochastic process results that lacks an equilibrium. The proportion of different types in the population continuously changes endogenously, without converging to an equilibrium.
which simply states that the expected value of the fraction 0 w n tþ1
1 of individuals in the population of already decided individuals who adhere to an X n at a time t þ 1, given its fraction at a time t, depends primarily on just that w n t and on an arbitrary, upwardsloping function q n t ðw n t Þ. This function assigns to any w n t a probability q n t that the next deciding individual will also pick X n . Time in this model is equal to the number of individuals who have decided themselves, i.e., it is assumed that at any point in time exactly one individual decides which theory to choose. The parameter m stands for the number of individuals who were already decided at t ¼ 0 and henceforth, we will simply assume N, with the underlying assumption that every X is backed by exactly one individual 0. From (1), the condition for an equilibrium is easily inferred. Beyond identifying the necessary condition for an equilibrium, existence has been proved in the original work by Arthur et al. 
Choice and equilibria on a theory market with heterogeneous individuals
We have now seen the equilibrium condition on the theory market, but the existence and the number of equilibria depends on the specification of the probability function. A natural approach to find out how the probability of an uncertain individual choosing n reacts to changes in w n t is to look for plausible assumptions regarding the behaviour of individuals under both uncertainty and rational ignorance. If individuals at any point in time deterministically chose that X n with the highest current market share, matters would be rather simple: The first individual at t ¼ 0 would choose randomly one theory to become the most-frequented one, and unconstrained herding behaviour would lead all subsequently deciding individuals to choose exactly the same. The process would be locked in on a path towards a stable equilibrium with w n t ¼ 1 for the majority theory, immediately after the first individual has made her random decision. Obviously, the resulting complete consensus among individuals regarding their beliefs about the proper economic policy contradicts even casual empirical evidence.
As an alternative, consider the situation when individuals are heterogeneous regarding their tendency to follow the majority. Let a denote the individual tendency to be conformist, with an a 2 ðÀ1; 0 signifying a strictly conformist individual who does always and uncompromisingly choose the majority opinion and an a 2 ½1; 1Þ signifiying a strictly non-conformist individual who always and uncompromisingly refuses to take the majority opinion. Values of a 2 ð0; 1Þ reflect different degrees of conformism, with the eventual choice depending on w. For example, an individual with a relatively high value of a just below unity is a relatively non-conformist individual by nature, but a very high w n t may still convince her to join the majority. Non-conformists are thus not completely deterred by large groups with an internal consensus -they just need a relatively bigger consensus group to convince them. When 6 out of 10 individuals report to a non-conformist that they have seen a black swan, he might remain unconvinced, but when 99 out of 100 report the same, even he is likely to believe in the existence of a black swan in the neighborhood. In other words, being a non-conformist is not the same as being intellectual hermit. On the contrary, a non-conformist is an individual who has a tendency to oppose the majority, but not an individual who seeks to distinguish himself by holding a deliberately obscure point of view. Even people who have a strong enough non-conformist tendency to pick the minority theory have a preference to be in a larger minority group, rather than a smaller minority group.
Let X* denote the most popular theory at any given time,
If there is no unique X* t , but a set of equally popular theories, then X* t is chosen randomly from this set, with equal probabilities of choice attached to each equally popular theory. Assume individuals value the available theories according to (3):
Again, if there is no unique maximum-valued theory but a set of two or more theories that yield equal values, the individual is assumed to choose randomly with equal probabilities from the theories in this set. 4 With these assumptions made, we can state Lemma 2. Let every individual decide on the choice of a theory according to the following rule: If there is exactly one maximum-valued theory, this theory will be chosen with certainty; if there are two ore more theories with valued equally, each of these is chosen with the same probability. With individuals being heterogeneous with respect to a, the theory market will effectively collapse to two competing theories, the majority theory and a preferred minority theory, after one non-conformist choice has been made. Proof. See the Appendix.
All individuals who make a non-conformist decision at later stages of the process will also choose X m , while all individuals making a conformist decision will choose the majority theory X*. The market shares of all other theories will tend towards zero with more and more individuals deciding between X* and X m . The reason is that non-conformism in our model is defined only as a weak aversion against the majority group, which may even be overcome if the majority group becomes sufficiently large. As soon as a the theory market is collapsed to N ¼ 2, (3) can be written as (3a),
and the a for which an individual is just indifferent between conformism and non-conformism can be calculated by equating both cases of (3a), which yields
The convergence in time of a a towards wðX*Þ follows simply from the fact that, once they are determined, only the majority theory and the preferred minority theory are chosen, so that the added market shares of these theories tend towards one. That does not mean that the other N À 2 theories that have existed on the theory market at t ¼ 0 disappear altogether, but they are marginalised and cease to have a noticeable impact on public discourse.
Knowing this, and making the assumption that otherwise indifferent individuals with behave as conformists, we can pin down a simple decision rule which connects the individual propensity to be a conformist with the relative frequency of the two remaining theories on the theory market.
Lemma 3. Sufficiently far into the sorting process on the theory market, individuals with % wðX*Þ will strictly prefer X* and individuals with a > a a % wðX*Þ will strictly prefer X m .
Proof. Lemma 3 follows straightforwardly from combining (4) with Lemma 2.
A bird's eye view on the theory market
As seen above, the (non-)conformism parameter a plays a crucial role for the decision of an uncertain individual for or against a theory that she is confronted with. In a hetereogenous population with individually differing propensities to be a conformist, it is therefore the distribution of values of a that will determine the actual shape of the probability function. To finally write down the q-function, suppose that values of a are normally distributed in the population with mean l ¼ 0:5 and an arbitrary standard deviar. Given the simple decision rule, we must find, for any feasible value of w* t the probability that the next individual drawn from the population has a w* t . Thus, given our assumption that values of a follow a normal distribution, we can then state that as soon as X* and X m are selected from the N available theories, the q-functions for these two theories converge towards
This leads to a characteristic sigmoidal graph for the two q-functions. Given that there is a positive probability that an individual has an a < 0 or an a > 1, it follows that > 0, q* t ð1Þ < 1, q m t ð0Þ > 0 and finally q m t ð1Þ < 1. The exact numerical values depend on r; a rise of r, would reflect a growing number of extreme conformists and non-conformists in the population. Such a change in the composition of the population is not modeled in this paper, however: r is assumed to be constant.
The relationship between the actual fraction w* t and the probability q* t of the next individual also choosing X* is depicted graphically in Figure 1 . There are two stable equilibria for w* on this theory market, one at w* 1 and one at w* 3 . In both cases, the probability of the next individual choosing X* is higher than the actual fraction w* t for an interval around w* 1;3 where w* t < w* 1;3 and lower for an interval where w* t > w* 1;3 . The attracting intervals are delimited by the unstable equilibrium at w* 2 ¼ l ¼ 0:5. For any w* t < w* 2 , the process will converge towards w* 1 and for any w* t > w* 2 it will converge towards w* 3 . Since X* has been defined the majority theory at the outset, we can expect its market share to converge towards w* 3 without further interventions into the process; the market share of the preferred minority theory X m will then converge towards w m ¼ 1 À w* 3 .
Choice of policy and its immediate effects
After having dealt extensively with the theory market, we now have to turn towards the real economy. In this Section 3, the focus will be on the immediate effects of a policy choice on net wages earned by a representative worker. In the subsequent Section 4, the individual migration decisions and the price signals generated in a decentralised political setting will be examined.
The model economy
Given that factor migration will play a prominent role in our argument, we introduce probably the simplest equilibrium conditions available in the literature on decentralised fiscal policy. We assume that each individual supplies one unit of homogeneous labor and is endowed with an arbitrarily high amount of homogeneous capital. Factors are allocated between two regions, j 2 fA; Bg, with the private sectors in both regions being characterised by standard, neoclassical production functions. Adding to this, we assume that the vector x ¼ ðk; h; GÞ comprises the policy conducted by the public sector with h denoting a lump-sum tax levied per unit of labour L, G denoting the quantity of a public good and k denoting the technology used to provide the public good. Presuming a perfectly controlled government, the entire tax revenue hL is transformed into productive public goods using a technology characterised by k, and no rents are accrued by individuals in the public sector, such that Public policy enters the private sector production function through a function qðxÞ with 8x. The effect of qðxÞ is exactly the same as that of a Hicks-neutral, factor-augmenting public input, and accordingly the private sector production function is assumed to be linear-homogeneous. Thus, the complete production function for each of the two jurisdictions can be written as
Individuals are assumed to be uncertain regarding the function qðxÞ, and uncertainty here implies not only parameter uncertainty, but also uncertainty regarding the functional form of q -in other words, individuals act under model uncertainty and are compelled to act upon fallible hypotheses about the effects of policy changes on the aggregate output, as well as those on the marginal productivities of labour and capital. This is exactly why we have modeled the adoption of policy-related beliefs as a path-dependent process in Section 2. Beliefs on policy spread through communication. While the individuals know thatG > 0 andh < 0, they do not know the exact functional form and can therefore not simply determine the optimal size of the public sector in a marginal calculus. They do not know which technology of supplying public goods is associated with which relative value of k. Note also that "technology'' may encompass a wide range of characteristics of the process of supplying public goods, including for example formal political institutions or modes of governance. Thus, again the question is: If different polities use different technologies, associated with different values of k -can we expect collective learning to take place?
The choice of policy
Since the policy-space is not one-dimensional here, involving the choice of k and h, existence and uniqueness of a median voter equilibrium in the traditional sense could not be guaranteed without imposing further assumptions. Note, however, that stability here effectively is imposed through the theory market, where majority preferences are clearly defined in a stable equilibrium, i.e. k and h are determined unambiguously by the choice X. As we have seen above, the frequency-dependent communication process will determine one unambiguous majority belief, although it cannot be determined ex ante which of the N beliefs offered at the outset will turn out to be this majority belief. However, with a sufficiently large set of theories available at the outset, it is very likely that two otherwise equal jurisdictions will settle on different majority beliefs in the course of the communication process. Under standard assumptions of models of deterministic voting, in particular under the assumption of honest voting and of full participation of the electorate in the vote, this implies that the policies enacted in the different jurisdictions are fully determined by the equilibrium on the theory market. In jurisdiction j, a majority belief X* j determines a tax * j , a technology of supplying public goods associated with a k* j and, given these policy choices, also a level of public goods G* j . Looking at regions that are small open economies relative to the world economy, the return per unit of capital in every region equals the world interest rate
Let the labour market be competitive such that labour is paid according to its marginal product. Furthermore, every individual supplies one unit of homogeneous labour. There are no individual decisions on labour supply at the intensive margin, and decisions at the extensive margin are restricted to decisions on the location in which labour is supplied.
For pre-and after-tax labour incomes in jurisdiction j, we thus have
Before a re-location of labour takes place, wage incomes are fully determined by the policy x * j representing the majority belief X*, and by the equilibrium condition for the capital market. Again, given that it is very unlikely that two jurisdictions independent of each other are led to the same majority belief, we can expect that different policies are enacted in different polities.
4 Factor migration and the price signals generated by decentralized policy
With the theory market being in place and having set up the simple model economy, we can now analyze the effects of factor migration in a simple two-jurisdiction economy. Note that the aim is deliberately not to use specific assumptions in order to guarantee unambiguous price signals, but to preserve generality by imposing only a few restrictions on the model economy. Within this model economy, market signals are produced that are ultimately processed on the political theory market in the fourth stage.
Loyal versus perfectly mobile individuals
Suppose that every individual i can be characterised by additively-separable preferences for both income and policy,
where u(x) is a positive procedural utility that can be gained from a policy vector x and that follows not from the outcome of a policy, but from the fact that the policy vector is in concurrence with the theory X i held by the individual. The utility of the actual outcome of the imposed policy is captured by y i ¼ l T þ r*, i.e. the sum of net wage and capital incomes. Let u(x) be a step function with uðxÞ ¼ u u if the individual lives in a jurisdiction where X i determines policy and uðxÞ ¼ 0 if not.
Three examples can help to illustrate what lies behind this specification. A very non-conformist individual characterised by an a ! 1 will never choose the majority theory, so that X i 6 ¼ X* and uðxÞ ¼ 0 necessarily follow. The second term of the utility function can therefore not become negative, even for extreme non-conformists. On the other hand, an extreme conformist with a < 0 is always characterised by X i ¼ X* and uðxÞ ¼ u u, and his procedural utility is strictly decreasing in a. Finally, for individuals who become gradually more non-conformist with a ! 1 from below, the procedural utility is either zero if X i 6 ¼ X*, or otherwise positive, but strictly decreasing in non-conformism.
Intuitively, this closely relates to the way in which the concept of moderate non-conformism has been introduced above. If moderate non-conformists with an a below, but relatively close to unity adopt the majority theory, they do this relatively reluctantly. They can be thought of as sceptical individuals, who will not follow the herd blindly, but who might become convinced by a sufficiently large majority that the theory held by this majority has some merit. In this sense, an individual with a stronger conformist tendency holds a larger stake in the majority theory. She is more easily convinced even by a smaller majority, and she has less of a sceptical attitude. Furthermore, it can also be argued that a more conformist individual enjoys a relatively higher procedural utility from having his X* implemented, simply because this implementation reflects a collective political agreement by a majority, of which she herself is a member. In other words: Being part of a politically successful majority certainly involves a higher utility for a conformist, who by definition enjoys being part of a majority, than for a moderate non-conformist, who (if at all) joins the majority more reluctantly.
Suppose further that an individual interested in other jurisdictions would need to invest c to gather meaningful information on foreign income earning opportunities. However, if the jurisdictions are heterogeneous with regard to their majority theories, any positive utility u u would be lost with a relocation. Assuming that i has an infinite time horizon and some a priori belief regarding the distribution of incomes that can be earned in other jurisdictions, at time t ¼ s she has an incentive to invest into gathering information about other jurisdictions only if
where d > 1 is a discount factor, Eðl T Àj Þ is the expected value of the highest net-wage to be discovered in a foreign jurisdiction Àj 6 ¼ j and Eðuðx Àj ÞÞ is the expected procedural utility in the foreign jurisdiction. Only net wages matter in the individual's consideration, because capital incomes are independent of location. It is evident that, with all other parameters fixed and with u u identical for all individuals, there must exist a threshold level of non-conformismâ a where for all a â a an individual abstains completely from gathering information about foreign jurisdictions herself. On the other hand, very non-conformist individuals with high levels of a are easily motivated to look for income earning opportunites in other jurisdictions. If, as proposed, political utility declines with the degree of moderate non-conformism, the relative non-conformist individuals will be those who are particularly eager to inform themselves about incomes to be earned in foreign jurisdictions. From these considerations, we arrive straightforwardly at Lemma 4. With constant and uniform costs of searching c, with the above assumptions on the distribution of non-conformism in the population, and assuming that the discounted expected wage differential without accounting for procedural utility is greater than c, individuals can be divided into two mutually exclusive sub-populations: One loyal group, whose members do not inform themselves about foreign jurisdictions at all, and one mobile group, whose members inform themselves and eventually will migrate whenever the discovered income differential l It is useful to discuss the third condition of Lemma 4 in some greater detail, namely that d ÀðtÀsÞ ½Eðl
Clearly, this inequality does not need to hold. If net wages in our home jurisdiction are already very high, it is likely not to hold, so that no individuals at all will inform themselves about foreign jurisdictions. However, with net wages in the home jurisdiction declining, it becomes more likely that this condition holds and that we have both loyal and mobile individuals. In other words, a decline of net wages in our home jurisdiction may be crucial in providing individual incentives to look beyond our borders.
The inverse relationship between political utility and the non-conformism parameter a, which we have introduced above, is plausible, but not an empirical necessity. It is therefore also useful to discuss in which respect this assumption is necessary for our model. Suppose that (12) instead takes the form Uðx; yÞ ¼ y i þ uðxÞ. As above, utility for all individuals who are part of the minority group is determined only by disposible income y i , since for them uðxÞ ¼ 0. They will therefore again be mobile and have an incentive to inform themselves. What is different now, is that the existence of immobile individuals is conditional on the actual value of u u. With a large enough political utility, the entire majority in a given jurisdiction is immobile, and only individuals who are sufficiently nonconformist to join the minority are willing to migrate. If, on the other hand, u u took a sufficiently small value, no individuals would choose to be loyal at all. The political utility that is enjoyed at home can, generally, become small enough such that the a priori conjectured gain in private incomes from migration induces all individuals to inform themselves on neighbouring jurisdictions. In this sense, models such as those mentioned in Section 1, where all individuals have sufficient private incentives to become well-informed, can be understood as a special case of the framework proposed here.
In general, a case is also conceivable where Uðx; yÞ ¼ y i þ auðxÞ. For example, extreme conformists, who simply follow the herd, may be not too emotionally attached to the political issues themselves. On the other hand, a moderate conformist, or a moderate non-conformist, who joins the majority only after some persuasion and deliberation with her peers, might, as a result of this process, become much more interested in the policy itself, and thus enjoy a higher political utility from the realization of her political preferences. And for those who are non-conformist enough not to be convinced by the majority opinion, we again have uðxÞ ¼ 0, so that the value of a does not matter for their political utility in any event. This specification does therefore yield a somewhat counter-intuitive scenario. Stricter conformism (remember that the lower the value of a, the stricter the individual conformism) would be assosciated with a higher propensity to leave the jurisdiction and search for better income-earning opportunities. The strict conformists, who do not care sufficiently strong about domestic politics, would, as far as their disloyalty to their home jurisdiction is concerned, find themselves in one group with strict non-conformists, who do not care about domestic politics at all. The group of individuals loyal to their home jurisdictions would, on the other hand, be composed of moderate conformists and moderate non-conformists -if this group exists at all, which again would depend on the value of u u being sufficiently high.
Taking this brief discussion into consideration, the specification chosen in (12) appears to be the most intuitive one, and also the specification that provides the most straightforward criterion to divide the population into a mobile and an immobile group, i.e. into a group with incentives to become informed on economic conditions in neighbouring jurisdictions, and one group which does not have these incentives. As seen above, such a partition of the population into two subsets can also be achieved under different assumptions, but the necessary conditions become somewhat more arbitrary and counter-intui-tive. We will therefore rely on our initial specification for the remainder of the theoretical discussion.
Signals generated by decentralized policy
The obvious signal generated in a decentralized setting is a wage differential between jurisdictions, which we will henceforth denote as a differential signal. Suppose two otherwise completely identical jurisdictions choose different policies with > qðx B Þ such that
Clearly, an equilibrium on the capital market requires that after the choice of policies, capital migrates instantaneously from B to A such that k A > k B in this equilibrium. Thus, mobility of capital reinforces the wage differential that is rooted in different public policies. But recognition of wage differentials will also induce migration of mobile (but not of loyal) individuals between two polities A and B, and this will obviously have an effect and l T B . An equilibrium on the interregional labour and capital markets would be reached when both conditions l T A ¼ l T B and r i ¼ r j ¼ r* held simultaneously. However, wage differentials may be persistent in our model since, given Lemma 4, the size of the group of mobile individuals is limited and migration might cease without wages being equalized. Also, note that the sign of the impact of labour migration on l T A and l T B is deliberately not determined unambiguously in this model, as it is probably not fully determined in reality. This can, as we will see shortly, lead to scenarios where migration of labour actually increases interjurisdictional wage differentials. Generally, differentiating the equilibrium wage with respect to the size of the labour force yields two counterveiling effects:
(1) The standard marginal productivity effect: Marginal productivity of labour rises (declines) with out-migration (in-migration) of labour.
(2) The tax base effect: The supplied quantity of public goods increases (decreases) for any strictly positive tax rate with in-migration (out-migration) due to the increase (decrease) in the size of the tax base.
If the positive effect of an increase of the labour force on qðxÞ is sufficiently large, net wages may actually increase with in-migration and decrease with out-migration. What is modeled here as a purely fiscal effect works in the same direction as other effects that are of real-world relevance but not explicitly considered here, such as agglomeration economies (see Dö ring and Schnellenbach 2006 for a survey). This leads us to Lemma 5. The net effect of labour migration on the after-tax wages paid in both regions is generally ambiguous due to the interaction of a direct marginal productivity effect with an indirect tax base effect.
Four different cases, which are summarised in Table 1 , can result from migration between two jurisdictions, in this case from a relatively inefficient region A to a relatively efficient region B.
While the differential signal results from given prices, we observe here changing prices of labour in A and B resulting from a regional shifting of resources. Such signals associated with price changes will thus be called shift signals.
Note that a reliable equilibriating tendency is asscociated only with scenario IV. In scenario I, there is a clear disequilibriating tendency resulting from factor migration, and in the other two scenarios the existence of an equilibrium depends on the relative velocity of the income effects of migration. If the marginal effect of migration on marginal productivity and on the tax base in B are consistently smaller than that in A, then there will be a tendency towards an equilibrium, associated with higher (III) or lower (II) incomes in both A and B. However, given the fact that there is a group of immobile individuals in our model, factor migration can come to a rest even with persisting income differentials.
How relevant is each of these scenarios? In our model, ql T j qLj > 0 does come about when positive tax base effects overcompensate negative effects on marginal productivity of labour. However, there are no general theoretical conditions for this to be the case. From an empirical perspective, we can find ample instances in economic history where a positive effect of immigration on net wages could be observed. For example, Volckart (2002) presents an analysis of the competition between regions for mobile labour in premodern Germany. He argues that labour has for long periods been scarce vis-á -vis land as a fixed factor. Elementary public goods such as security could be provided more efficiently in more densely populated areas, and a decline of the marginal productivity of labour with immigration was not a problem, as long as agricultural land was abundant. More recently, Peri (2007) presents evidence for the US state of California, where almost 30 % of all foreign born workers in the United States are located. He finds that between 1960 and 2004, immigration to California had a positive effect on the wages of most native born workers, and he argues that the reason is that migrants offer types of labour that are complements, not substitutes to native labour supply. Brü cker and Jahn (2008) find similar results for native workers in Germany.
Obviously, the complementarity argument rests on the existence of heterogeneity between native and foreign workers. This is plausible for international migration, but it may be less plausible for migration between relatively similar sub-central jurisdictions in a federal state. Indeed, Platt Boustan et al. (2007) find that during the Great Depression in the United States, in-migration from within the country had adverse effects on the earning opportunities of native workers. It appears therefore that, depending on the particular conditions that we find in a federation -in particular depending on the size and heterogeneity of regions, and on the heterogeneity of their labour forces -none of the four scenarios depicted above can be ruled out as an unrealistic outcome.
Learning from another jurisdiction's policies
In the discussion so far, all necessary elements of an analysis of collective learning processes have been sketched: The theory market itself, the individual decision to migrate or to remain loyal to one's native region, a simple model of the real economy and the price signals available in a decentralised framework. In order to analyse the collective learning process itself, we will now have to integrate these pieces of analysis and return to the theory market sketched in Section 2. Since a precondition for collective learning is instability on the theory market, we have to ask under which conditions the price signals can be expected to perturb given equlibria and thereby spark collective learning proces-
Collective learning on the theory market
Picking up the thread of Section 2.2, some statements regarding the stability of an equilibrium on the theory market can be made. Let stability s ¼ sðl; tÞ be defined as the absolute number of individuals who simultaneously need to change their minds in order to transform the status quo majority theory X* into a minority theory. Remember that, by definition, the equilibrium frequency of the majority theory X* must be w* 3 -as long as it is indeed favored by the majority. If the value of l, i.e. of the mean of the distribution of the non-conformism-parameter a, rises, the population becomes on average more nonconformist. As a result, the distance w* 3 À w* 2 in Figure 1 is reduced, so that the attracting region of w* 3 becomes smaller while the attracting region of w* 1 , where X* is transformed into an equilibrium minority theory, is enlarged. On the other hand, the positive impact of time on the stability of an equilibrium follows from the technical assumption that at any point in time t exactly one individual decides which theory she wants to pick. As a result, the frequencies are stable in equilibrium, but the absolute number s of individuals that need to change their minds to move the theory market to another equilibrium rises t. This may appear to be an unrealistic feature of the model on first sight, but it can also be argued that is helps to approximate the fact that long-conveyed, traditional modes of thinking about economic policy are more difficult to change than theories that have only recently been introduced and that are not as deeply rooted. Given the approach that we have chosen to model a propensity to be conformist, it is relatively straightforward to introduce a catalyst for collective learning processes. The basic question is: In which form can experience with status quo policies have an impact on the existence and the properties of particular fix points. Remember that at the outset, before experience was considered, l ¼ 0:5 was assumed, i.e., we assumed individuals to be symmetrically distributed along the lines of conformism and non-conformism. But it appears to be a plausible assumption that l changes when, based upon experience, individuals start to have reason to believe that X* is faulty. If a policy based upon the majority theory produces disappointing results, we should expect that for individuals who still have to decide themselves, the propensity to be a conformist is reduced. The more implausible a theory appears in the light of evidence, the more difficult it becomes ceteris paribus to convince oneself that it is nevertheless the correct theory. The result is a decline of conformism in the following sense: An individual who is yet to decide on the theory to pick is characterised by a given value of a, and would thus have so far needed a certain relative frequency of wðaÞ associated with the majority theory to also become convinced of X*. The more conformist the individual is, the smaller the necessary majority becomes, i.e. a ! 0 implies wðaÞ ! 0:5. But with rising skepticism and a decline of conformism in the yet-to-decide population, the same individual would experience an increase of his value of a -he would now only follow a larger, in this sense more convincing, majority. If such a large majority does not exist, he will instead become a believer in the minority theory. This leads us to Proposition 1. If there is a sufficiently large decline of mean conformism in the population (a sufficiently large increase of l) for a sufficiently long transitory period of time (for sufficiently many individuals to choose a theory in this period of time) the status quo majority theory becomes the minority theory, and vice versa. Proof. See the Appendix. The key to change on the theory market thus is, as one might have expected, disappointing experience with the policies that have been introduced as being in line with the status quo majority theory. It is, however, important to note that a substantial increase of nonconformism is necessary for this to occur. For only moderate increases, we will experience a decrease of the majority theory's market share, and an accompanying reduction of s ¼ sðl; tÞ, but it will nevertheless remain the theory accepted by a majority of voters. We can think of the theories as being supported by very stable social networks in their fix points, and these networks can absorb even relatively large shocks to which the theory market may be exposed. The remaining question thus is if, and under which condition, we can expect a shock that is sufficiently large to destabilise a given majority theory.
Learning from differential signals
What seems particularly appealing about learning from differential signals is that individuals can learn from the policies conducted in neighbouring jurisdictions without the occurrence of any potentially distorting spatial factor movements. In our framework, however, the prospects for political learning from differential signals are dim. We have seen in the first Proposition that destabilising any given equilibrium on the theory market requires a substantial, widespread discontent with the status quo in the social communication processes about policy. Only in this case a sufficiently strong, transitory increase of non-conformism will occur to lead enough yet undecided individuals towards the preferred minority theory such that a reversal of equilibria on the theory market can take place. However, Lemma 4 informs us that there is a group of loyal individuals in each jurisdiction who will not invest into gathering information on policy and political results in the other jurisdiction. Furthermore, these loyal individuals will be predominantly those who enjoy a high procedural-political utility u -those who support the incumbent majority theory. In other words, societal communication processes are dominated by those who support the status quo and who have an incentive to ignore, rather than spread information that casts doubt on the status quo. Even the presence of a very strong and non-mobile non-conformist faction in the polity does not substantially change this argument. There may be such loyal non-conformists, if in (8) even with u ¼ 0 the cost component assumes a larger value than the expected income differential. However, with the non-conformists being non-mobile, and acting behind a veil of insignificance in their domestic political process, they will not actively invest into receiving and (probably more importantly) correctly interpreting differential signals. Mobile non-conformists, on the other hand, migrate whenever they find a large enough income differential. They produce shift signals, but do not engage in the domestic discourse on policy. This reasoning leads us straightforwardly to Proposition 2. Differential signals will generally not suffice to destabilise an equilibrium on the theory market populated by non-mobile individuals acting behind a veil of insignificance. There is some empirical evidence, most prominently provided by Besley and Case (1995) , on political yardstick competition. They show that voters in American states tend to deny re-election to incumbent governors who raise taxes while their colleagues in neighbouring jurisdictions do not, while they tend to accept tax raises when neighbouring governors also raise taxes. Voters appear to interpret a solitary tax increase as a sign of government waste, or rent-extraction, while a common tax increase is interpreted as a signal for a real economic necessity of increasing taxes. This observation supports our initial assumption of tightly controlled governments, but also seems to indicate that voters do in fact use the differential signal of tax rate differentials. However, the mechanism is shown to fail for other issues of economic policy: for regionally differing income levels and unemployment rates, Besley and Case find no significant influence on the individuals' voting decisions. This is a somewhat puzzling result; if voters learn from the comparison of regionally differing tax policies, and a lone tax raise is deciphered as a sign for inefficiency, then why does the same mechanism not work for other fields of policy? From the perspective of our model, two points can be made: (i) the tax rate alone is a very simple signal, and its isolated interpretation requires little effort compared to the interpretation of information on the interaction of k, h and G; (ii) voters appear to use this signal for controlling self-interested incumbents, but not to update their knowledge on economic policy as a whole. 
Learning from shift signals
The argument is substantially different for shift signals. Migration flows have an impact on the net incomes of the loyal individuals who remain in their home jurisdictions, and it is difficult to ignore a signal that manifests itself in a change of one's own budget constraint. Therefore, sufficiently large migration between jurisdictions, with sufficiently large decreases of the incomes of loyal individuals, can indeed be expected to lead to change the mood of societal communication processes on economic policy, i.e. to lead to an increase of skepticism and the mean of non-conformism in the population. However, Table 1 shows that, if one does not enforce restrictive assumptions, the sign of the effect of migration out of the relatively inefficient region on net wages is not fully determined. A larger tax base allowing to finance more productive infrastructure may overcompensate the direct effect on marginal labour productivity, or it may not. In the relatively inefficient region, net incomes may actually rise as a result of out-migration if the public goods effect does not overcompensate the direct effect on marginal productivity: Loyal individuals would then experience the shift signal as a positive loosening of their private budget constraint
In Table 1 , only Scenario I provides unambiguously efficient incentives. Migration out of the relatively inefficient and into the relatively efficient region leads to higher net wages in the relatively efficient, and lower net wages in the relatively inefficient region. As a result, in the region with the relatively inefficient policy, a distortion of the local theory market can eventually be achieved, and political experimentation can be conducted in this polity. However, from a standard neoclassical perspective, Scenario I is the most unlikely one, because in both jurisdictions the tax base effects would have to overcompenAlso, evidence on tax mimicking in other countries than the United States indicates that incumbent politicians anticipate the specific control function of yardstick competition with tax rates. As for instance Revelli (2001 Revelli ( , 2002 shows for the United Kingdom, Heyndels/Vuchelen (1997) show for Belgium and Feld/Reulier (2005) show for Switzerland, tax increases in neighboring jurisdictions are often taken as an opportunity to increase taxes at home. For evidence on the relationship between decentralisation and control of representatives, see also Feld et al. (2007). sate the standard effects on wages in the production function. The other Scenarios are associated with perverse incentives for collective learning in at least one of the two jurisdictions. If Scenarios III or IV occur, the remaining individuals in the relatively inefficient region experience a raise of their incomes after labour mobility is implemented. In Scenario IV, the loyal individuals in the relatively efficient jurisdiction may become convinced to revise their relative efficient policy due to the "wrong'' informational content of the price signal. We therefore have Proposition 3. Shift signals can be expected to destabilise equilibria on the theory markets if they are sufficiently strong (if migration flows are sufficiently broad), but there is no reason to systematically expect these signals to have the desired effect in, and only in, the relatively inefficient jurisdiction, where a change of policy would be unambiguously preferable. These problems could be reduced if individuals learn from both type of signals considered here. To also reckon that the level of incomes is higher in B than it is in A would certainly be an improvement compared to an exclusive reliance on shift signals. This is especially true for the scenarios that imply a further divergence of income levels, i.e. that do not lead the model economy towards the equilibrium conditions on the interjurisdictional labour and capital markets, and where migration flows only end when all mobile individuals have exploited the regional income differentials. The additional information would enforce justified scepticism in A. If there is no divergence, though, then a convergence of income levels could easily serve as an argument to defend X* A : if the income level in B is decreasing, then this can be easily interpreted as an indicator for an increasing fitness of X* A relative to X* B . Thus, there is generally even more information necessary to ensure that individuals have the correct incentives. They would need to know the differential signal, the shift signal and they would need to reckon that the shift signal follows from migration and that migration out of A is a sign of relative inefficiency of X* A . This may be trivial for an economist -but for an individual who defends his set of conjectures behind a veil of insignificance and within a stabilising social network, a willingness to face the facts cannot be simply presupposed.
Conclusion and outlook
The line of argument presented in this paper has shown that fiscal decentralisation is not a reliable source of political learning processes in the "correct'', i.e. the relative inefficient, region. Nevertheless, from a very long-run, knowledge-producing perspective, a decentralised regime still ought to be preferred to a centralised one. Decentralisation delivers a systematic tendency to destabilise equilibria on the theory market. Even if this does not necessarily occur in the correct jurisdiction, a revision of the majority theory in any region causes political innovation and therefore, from a long-run perspective, a growth in the stock of policy-related knowledge. A unitary system is missing the inherent instability that comes with the price signal produced by factor migration, and is thus bound to produce less knowledge in the long run. In this respect, there is a connection to the body of literature on economic policy reform (see Rodrik 1996 for a survey), which predicts that fundamental reform measures are most likely to be introduced in times of crises. Our model shows that factor mobility between regions may be a plausible source of such crises, that in turn destabilise equilibria on the theory market. We have attempted to conduct a thought experiment in this paper, with two underlying objectives: One was that the focus should be on the demand side of the political process -the question is if and when voters learn about the relative efficiency of different policies. The other objective was to analyse this under a deliberately unfavourable set of incentives for individual learning, namely under conditions of rational ignorance. The aim was to critically examine the analogy between price signals on markets for private goods, and what price signals can achieve on a political theory market. It is obvious that the assumption of a government that is perfectly controlled by the median voter is both extreme and unrealistic. It has been made in order to focus the analysis on problems of collective learning, and to isolate these issues from the control problems that are traditionally of primary interest to politico-economic theories. Matters would become far more complicated in a model incorporating both of these problems. Take, for example, learning from the price signals caused by factor movements: Individuals experiencing a decline in net wages would have to infer from this signal whether this takes place due to a problem with their technology of public good provision, or due to excessive rent-extraction by self-interested representatives, who consume a part of the tax revenue. The argument that "bad'' (in the sense of incompetent or greedy) representatives are in office might even serve as an ad-hoc hypothesis to defend the current technology of public good provision. Adding a control problem may well lead to even more intertia on the theory market.
On the other hand, the framework presented here does also necessarily evoke some doubts with regard to control mechanisms like yardstick competition. This may appear as somewhat paradoxical, given that we assume a tightly controlled government, and that yardstick competition is often perceived as an important tool to provide for a tight control of representatives. In other words, we cannot argue that our assumption of a political process controlled by the median voter is rooted in our model of federalism -control must enter the model through a different mechanism, such as the assumed availability of direct-democratic instruments. The reason why yardstick competition would not fare too well in our framework is the combination of rational ignorance and a relatively complex political problem, involving a tax rate and a technology of public good provision. It is quite likely that individuals in reality are somewhat less ignorant than they are in our thought experiment, which would explain why Besley and Case (1995) find that probabilities of re-election on the gubernatorial level decrease with lone tax increases. However, it is also quite likely that a substantial degree of rational ignorance is still at work, which might explain why Besley and Case find no significant reaction of re-election probabilities to differences between states in a number of other parameters.
Another natural question is how representatives would use their additional leeway in a framework with a less than perfectly controlled government. The famous, and highly controversial, Schumpeter hypothesis states that private entrepreneurs become more innovative, the larger their market share (see e.g. Witt 2002) . A similar implication could be suspected here. Representatives who can extract a positive rent from governing might find it worthwhile to experiment with novel policies. If these turn out to be efficient and generate higher tax revenue, their rents will also increase. One could thus suspect that additional leeway for representatives might increase the scope for political experimentation and political learning. However, while private entrepreneurs, even if they have market power, are still disciplined to some degree through the price system, uncontrolled public entrepreneurs in pursuit of their self-interest have a potential to make decisions that are immensely harmful to voters. Recommending to increase the leeway of representatives in order to facilitate political innovations would therefore be very premature and, in fact, dangerous (see Schnellenbach 2007 for a detailed discussion of this issue).
Finally, our results also relate to the literature on the political economics of fragmented constituencies. For example, Alesina et al. (1999) show that ethnically more fragmented constituencies in the United States are characterised by a lower supply of public goods and more redistributive public spending. In our model, fragmentation cannot be introduced along ethnic, but only along ideological lines. Increased fragmentation here would be observable as a lower market share of the majority position, which would imply less stability of equilibria on the theory market. Increased fragmentation would be associated with a higher frequency of experimentation with novel policies, and thus, from a perspective with a focus on knowledge problems, with a faster growing stock of policy-related knowledge. However, it is obviously an empirical question whether this positive effect overcompensates the negative effects discussed by Alesina et al., and other negative effects following from political instability. From a theoretical viewpoint, building a more comprehensive model integrating these counterveiling effects would be a task for the future.
Appendix

A1 Proof of Lemma 2
The first individual at t ¼ 1 decides randomly, so that some theory will become X*, which becomes at this point the only element of W :¼ fX n 2 fX 1 ; :::; X N g : arg max tðXÞg. As long as the subsequent choices are made by individuals who are sufficiently conformist to also pick X*, all other theories X n 6 2 W have a following of identical size. When the first individual enters who is sufficiently non-conformist to decide herself randomly for one particular X m 6 2 W, then it follows straightforwardly from the second line in (3) that, due to its greater following, X m will be preferred to any other X n 6 2 W in every subsequent non-conformist choice. Therefore, individuals deciding after the first non-conformist choice will effectively always have the choice set fX*; X m g.
A2 Proof of Lemma 4
Remember that the assumption on the distribution of a implies that for some very conformist individuals, a reaches arbitrarily large negative values. Let uðx j Þ ¼ u u. Then the bracketed term Eðuðx Àj ÞÞ À uðx j Þ will always be negative as long as the probability is less than unity that in Àj the same policy is employed, which is reasonable to assume. Holding the first two terms fixed, there will therefore always, even for arbitrarily large expected wage differentials, be a value ofâ a where for all a <â a inequality (13) does not hold and the very conformist individuals do not collect information on other jurisdictions. For very non-conformist individuals, the third term in (13) becomes irrelevant, because individuals with a > 1 are always in the opposition as strict non-conformists, with uðxÞ ¼ 0 for them, and also Eðuðx Àj ÞÞ ¼ 0, because they will also be non-conformists in Àj. They will inform themselves about other jurisdictions whenever the expected income differential is sufficiently large.
A3 Proof of Proposition 1
Let z ¼ ðw*; qðw*ÞÞ be the status quo fix point, associated with a frequency w* > 0:5 for X* and, given that z is a fix point, qðw*Þ ¼ w*. Let l increase by an arbitrarily small, positive E. This implies that q lþE ðw*Þ < w*, and given our assumptions regarding the shape of qðÁÞ, z must wander to the left, w* À w* l*þE > 0. Let d ¼ ðw d ; qðw d ÞÞ denote the unstable fix point which delimits the attracting regions of the majority fix point of X* from the attracting region of the second fix point, where X* would be transformed into the equilibrium minority theory. It is straightforward that w d ¼ qðw d Þ ¼ l at all times, so that with any increase of l, d shifts to the right, w d À w d lþE < 0. The result is that unequivocally, qsðl;tÞ ql < 08s > 0. If we repeat this procedure often enough, we will at some stage approach w* À w d ¼ 0. From thereon, and for any further increases of l, the stable majority fix point w* ceases to exist. As long as l does not fall below the critical value again, the relative frequency of X* will deteriorate until a lower stable fix point is reached, where X* is now held only by a stable minority. If, after a period of transitory skepticism, l bounces back to l ¼ 0:5, the newly determined status of X* as a minority theory is not in jeopardy, since the existence and stability of a minority fix point follows directly from our assumption of a normally distributed a.
